Essay: To what extent should British governments intervene with anonymous profiles on X?

To what extent should British governments intervene with anonymous profiles on X?

Liam Rosser, Politics Student, University of Bristol

Anonymous profiles have become a phenomenon on social media platforms, posing risks to the public. X (previously Twitter) is a prolific example that permits the ability to manufacture anonymous accounts through limited verification processes. In 2014, a study discovered that over 25% of users were semi-anonymous, in that they did not disclose their first or last name and 5.9% were completely anonymous, displaying an importance of anonymity in the functionality of X and as a strong selling point for the platform to gain users (Peddinti et al, 2014). As seen, anonymous accounts make up a large proportion of the users on the platform and possess great influence on other users. Although, there are discussions arising on the ethicality of the British government allowing social media platforms, like X, to benefit over the possible dangers anonymous profiles can bring. On the other hand, some citizens argue anonymous accounts open a plethora of opportunities previously closed off. In this essay, I will weigh both positive and negative impacts of anonymous accounts through the case study of X. This will lead to the conclusion that the negative contributions of anonymous profiles overwhelm the positive and that more control over social media corporations’ permission to create anonymous profiles should be exercised by the British government. I shall finish my assessment by suggesting possible strategies the British governments could implement to decrease these negative contributions.

Firstly, anonymous profiles provide users the ability to execute their right to freedom of expression in greater confidence and contribute more rewarding insight to society. In fact, they were found to post different content to non-anonymous profiles, encompassing more sensitive topics for debate, including, confessions, relationships, meetup, and QnA/Advice (Correa et al, 2015). Therefore, content that was lacking from X is added by anonymous profiles, contributing more multidimensional views on subjects shied away from by identifiable individuals. This ignites important discussions on serious matters is necessary to generate greater discourse, improving society’s functionality through constructing structure and order to thought. Its capacity to strengthen society should be appreciated as it enables more valuable, secretive and vital knowledge to become exposed and spread to peer users, empowering individuals to speak up on important issues (Doyle, 2016).

Although, not all contributions from anonymous profiles are constructive to the collective nature of society. Instead, it can be used as a tool to conspire against marginalised groups and preach extremist views, leading to the reproduction of hate speech through echo chambers (Criss, 2021). A reoccurring theme within these echo chambers on X, especially far-right ideologies, is the constant deployment of racism as a form of abuse and oppression. In Britain, racism has been a concerning feature, especially within football, reflected through X. This was highlighted after the Euro 2020 final loss, where anti-Black racist remarks were expressed from the crowd, and later online, towards three Black players: Rashford, Sancho and Saka (Kilvington, 2023). Despite X’s best efforts to invoke censorship through “taking down more than 1,000 posts over the previous 24 hours”, users were able to operate covertly across message boards using anonymous accounts (BBC Sport, 2021). This resulted in 5 people being arrested for their contributions online, but many were able to escape these consequences due to the structure of X allowing offenders anonymity to protect themselves from being identified (BBC Sport, 2021). Therefore, the power of anonymity provides unique experiences and consequences that only anonymity can administer to society for better or worse. Providing citizens the mechanism of anonymity, allows this offline activity to be furthered online, transferring hateful language within the stadia to X. The widespread nature of X, could result in these extreme ideologies being internalised to a wider context through a more easily influenced audience, silencing marginalised voices further, deriving a dysfunctional society that results in greater apartheid.

Race is not the only identity impacted by anonymous accounts on X and offline individuals. In the UK, social acceptance for the LGBTQ+ community has increased, but homophobia and disagreements on sexuality is still present. Therefore, the process for coming out can be a difficult and confusing time for individuals to manage. Using anonymous profiles can allow individuals a gateway to liberate themselves in feeling constrained from the reigns of a heteronormative society, as many LGBTQ+ identities feel that social expectations and cultural norms overshadow their ability to self-expression. On X, “menfess” accounts can provide individuals an access to advice without needing to exchange any personal identification (Ifnafiar and Isnaini, 2023) They are profiles where anonymous individuals can message confessions secretively to the ‘menfess’ account, in which they post to the public domain. From these posts, it provides a safe space for vulnerable individuals to anonymously engage with necessary guidance and support on their concerns without having the fear of being revealed and judged. Open communication can commence that is not hindered on stereotypes or bias’s people may exhibit when presented with an identity of a person, instead, there is a greater focus on the substance presented. It provides more effective education for LGBTQ+ members to learn about their emerging identity from resources that are lacking or unable to obtain within the offline world. (Fox and Ralston, 2016). Positive changes to LGBTQ+ topics can lead to greater acceptance in the political and social climate, deriving from their secretive but loud presence through anonymous accounts.

This act of kindness and good faith can however be exploited for ulterior motives. Anonymous profiles can be weaponised as a tactic used by criminals to target vulnerable groups, typically children and women (Hughes, 2002). It is the perfect cover for sex traffickers and terrorist organisation to implement grooming techniques to gain personally identifiable information (PII) and trick individuals into trusting them. These grooming techniques include “skeleton persona generation”, where criminals will examine datasets of past human trafficking victims and inspect their demographic information (Alghofaili, N., 2018). This data is then used to enforce “persona enrichment”, which involves criminals altering their perceived identity to suit the similarities of their targets (Alghofaili, N., 2018). Using the case study of DH, it portrays this process in action. DH was groomed for 2 years online by a man in his 30-40s before reporting him to the police, yet he presented himself as 16 years old as well. It exemplifies how anonymous profiles can be utilised to mould criminals’ identities around their targets profile, casting imagery of similar demographic facts and interests (Smith, 2023). Doing so, invokes a false sense of safety that makes vulnerable groups more trusting in the idealised versions of profiles criminals manifest, allowing them to use manipulation to create emotional attachments that lead to abductions. Through the allowance of anonymous profiles, it puts the British citizens in danger in which the government should be protecting.

Many abductions often go unmentioned within the media, with a lack of coverage on certain cases, but cyberactivism has seen a rise in fighting for these social issues to be heard. Previously, cyberactivism was not recognised within mainstream media for its immense impacts, but, over the years, it has become immensely covered by mass media, including X. To digital users it acts as a mighty tool that has great political power to influence ongoing debates. Often, these online activists will use anonymous profiles to speak more freely on important issues and organise protests without repercussions in the scope of the law (McGovern and Fortin, 2020). This includes whistle-blowers exposing sensitive information, in which they believe need to be disclosed to the public. “Anonymous” are a prolific cyberactivism group who expose information across various platforms like X and construct their networks through hashtags such as “#Anonymous” (Beraldo, 2022). Their anonymous identities/accounts, allow for secretive knowledge to be uncovered such as high-level government corruption, human rights abuses and extremist ideologies online. A recurring theme they deal with is combatting pro-Islamic State posts that is being circulated on the platform. In response, Anonymous members published handles related to these posts, constantly re-posting them to get the attention of X staff to get their accounts banned from the platform. They claimed responsibility for succeeding in 800 X accounts being removed and helping to minimise extremist ideology (Richards and Wood, 2018). A safer political world can be created, stemming from anonymous profiles on X, with groups like anonymous decreasing unjust speech and exposing individuals for spewing harmful ideologies.

Activism can present itself in many forms, sometimes for the worse with different voices believing in alternative issues that may not be useful for creating a productive society within the UK. Anonymous profiles on X, have the capacity to provoke groups, spread misinformation and generate societal backing to fight for certain agendas. These agendas can result in supporting dangerous proposals that lead to distressing activities. A main worry is the organisation of protests that, instead of being peaceful, are violent. The 2011 Summer Riots were a prime example that exhibited social deviance stemming from activity online, reducing the functionality and social control within Britain. This was possible due to the formation of an “anonymity consciousness”, which entails individuals avoiding being identified in the offline world and refusal to engage with strangers when in a public space, encouraging greater participation in these deviant acts (Tominaga et al, 2018). Therefore, individuals were perceived to internalise their anonymous online personas, evidenced by many individuals wearing masks to disguise themselves from their participation in the heinous crimes committed. Devastating results amounted because of this process with 5 deaths occurring and masses of economic destruction such as “Sivaharan Kandiah’s convenience store in Hackney being looted and losing £50,000 of stock in alcohol and cigarettes alone” (Bell, 2021). The UK government were furious with Twitter at the time for mobilising its possibility through allowing anonymous profiles to encourage this sort of activity. They went as far to release bold statements that they would remove Twitter from British online platforms if it did not improve its censorship and if a similar event happened in the future (Ball and Lewis, 2011).

Shown by the 2011 Summer Riots, the British governments relationship with X has always been fragile and tensions have grown as the platform has expanded over the years. Deployment of surveillance upon X’s actions have been long implemented by the government to monitor communications networks and identify potential criminal activity. However, this surveillance has been limited through certain acts protecting individual rights and restricting the government’s ability to intervene through narrow criteria permitting them powers to do so. For example, the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, specifically article 8, saw the development of the ‘right to respect for private life’ in UK law (Legislation.gov.uk, 1998). Therefore, surveillance as a technique is tightly controlled by legislation to ensure these rights are not being violated and clearer rules are set. This right to privacy is necessary to create social boundaries that are respected and to allow citizens to freely engage in politics (Soken-Huberty, 2020). Instead, spying on citizens without probable cause, would limit the positives anonymous profiles provide through increasing freedom of speech, identity liberation and constructive cyberactivism. This should be maintained throughout different dimensions in society such as throughout the online world. Within the legislation, it states that “privacy does not end when entering public spaces” and X is considered a public domain, meaning it should be applied the same rights (Legislation.gov.uk, 1998). Intervention in disabling anonymous profiles on X by the government is a controversial topic as it threatens these foundations that make up a democratic society.

As important as the right to privacy is, it can be overruled by greater concerns within the UK such as the protection of security. Governments should provide a good balance between the two concerns, trying to deliver a just medium. Although, in some circumstances, the two concepts cannot be mutually inclusive, making it hard to decide which concept should override the other. Over the years, the right to privacy has been exploited as an appropriate excuse for the allowance of anonymous profiles, permitting greater corruption of unstable repercussions in Britain such as hate speech, sex trafficking and violent protests (Ivanovic, 2017). Much like the adaptation of previously productive positives into these exploitative uses of anonymous profiles, laws need to be updated to match the current demand for greater security against these new and increasing exercises of abusive power. Therefore, a legal complexity is intertwined in creating a balanced and efficient solution as ‘cyberdeterrence strategy remains largely unexplored and underdeveloped, due to a limited understanding of how the principles of deterrence can be applied to the cyber domain’ (Stoddart, 2016). The British government need to take greater measures to improve their understanding of cyber security to combat increasingly worrying secretive features online such as anonymous profiles that are seen to endanger citizens greatly. Despite X claiming that they do not support anonymous profiles, they benefit from increased user engagement and as a private company it has no responsibility for national security, that is the government’s role.

There are many different strategies the British government could take to attend to the issues surrounding anonymous profiles on X. A clear assessment is that no matter what, the British government need to take action as refraining from any intervention has proven to permit the negative impacts anonymous profiles cause to thrive, with some claiming the cyberspace in Britain is the “land of the lawless” (Milmo, 2021). Prior attempts at “analog” anonymity intervention have been observed to successfully promote social control through the introduction of widespread CCTV in public areas. This panopticon experience proved to reduce crime by 13% in places with CCTV, compared to places without it, proving that interference to anonymity decreases its power (College of Policing, 2024). Expanding this to the semi-public sphere of social media is necessary to mimic its ability to mitigate negative effects such as crime.  As well, another ploy was implemented where the British government enforced the Identity Cards Act 2006 which enforced over 16 years olds to be entered into the National Identity Register (‘NIR’). Greater assurance to safety was achieved through identifying individuals more easily, ensuring individuals could not escape consequences, instead they would be held more responsible for their actions (Legislation.gov.uk, 2023). Its introduction displayed efforts to increase transparency of national identities through enforcing verification (Sullivan, 2006). The UK government could implement a similar law to the online world, extending required identification to all profiles. Doing so, could result in the complete eradication of anonymous profiles and impose greater verification processes, eliminating the possibility of individuals performing deceptive advantages that anonymity provides. However, this has not been enforced to social media platforms as it would result in mass uproar and resistance. This is because it would be deemed an extreme measure and infringe on human rights that citizens are entitled to, such as the right to privacy. Enforcing this type of law online would be unwise.

Alternative measures may deem to be more all-encompassing. Governments should take a more balanced strategy that ensures the advantages in anonymous identities are maintained, whilst simultaneously mitigating the negative impacts. This is especially necessary when taking into consideration that X is privately owned and should still have some rights to their own autonomy. Although, some form of government jurisdiction is necessary within any privately owned company as they can impact the public immensely. The British government are preparing to cross this line by imposing a bill called ‘The Online Safety Bill’ which will incorporate different laws to execute across the British digital dimension (Milmo, 2022). Focusing on anonymous accounts on X, one new proposed law that would affect anonymous profiles the most is the enforcement of providing government-issued ID or using two-factor authentication to allow users to create an account. You would be regarded as a verified profile and have the power to decide whether you want to interact with or receive content from unverified or anonymous accounts, as well as being able to block them entirely from seeing your account’s content. Using these new measures would successfully decrease the potential for harm by ensuring accountability for hate speech and minimising its presence, protecting vulnerable groups from exploitation and immobilising violent protests. On the other hand, it still has the potential to allow individuals free speech, identity liberation and perform constructive Cyberactivism. Also, human right laws still would be respected by allowing users the choice to interact with anonymous accounts or become an anonymous account themselves with restricted access. Although, it would be naïve to believe that this will solve every problem anonymous accounts bring, yet it is the closest compromise to ensuring human rights are protected and positive outcomes are omitted rather than cynical actions dominating. This Bill has been in the works for some time with constant delays occurring, portraying that the British government need to react faster to cyber problems.

In conclusion, with the rapid expansion of anonymous accounts on X and the lack of intervention from the British government, the potential for malicious action will only rise despite the performance of affirmative action (Stoddart, 2016). Compounding evidence portrays that too often the positive prospects restrict the necessary interception to prevent anonymous accounts from performing harm. Also, the interception is difficult as previous laws do not fit the framework contemporary society is currently positioned, with the constant extension of cyberspace advancing past previous conceptive thinking. Although, it is important that these positive and historic aspects should not be undermined, instead they need to be considered and attempted to be somewhat still in effect by maintaining elements of secrecy. Therefore, the British government should take a more diplomatic approach by assessing the most stable strategies and finding a way to confront anonymous profiles on X, without jeopardising these ideals. The Online Safety Bill appears to be a well assessed scheme that can deliver this theoretical scenario through appropriate surveillance and censorship, but the British government needs to enact these types of proposals in a quicker and more efficient manner to keep up with anonymities exploitative grasp on X and the wider digital world.

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